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NOTES
Post-Brown Private White Schools-An Imperfect
Dualism
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the South has had very few private schools. The Seaboard States have had private schools since the days when plantation
owners sent their children to them, but the South never rivaled New
England in producing a significant number of private schools. Southern
states traditionally have had a small number of sectarian schools, but
only Louisiana ever sent a significant portion of her children to religiously related private schools. The absence of traditional southern private schools is largely due to the absence of two factors that traditionally have fostered the growth of nonsectarian private schools in American-aristocracy and affluence. The combination of these factors has
not been present in the South to a significant degree since Reconstruction. Nevertheless, there has been a tremendous surge of support for
private schools in the last ten years. This support for private schools has
not resulted from a sudden increase in either aristocracy or affluence;
it has resulted from an attempt by private individuals to discriminate
in a manner forbidden to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
By virtue of state legislation, the South maintained a racially segregated public school system until 1954. The Supreme Court found this
system violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in Brown v. Board of Education.' The Court held that racially
separate facilities are inherently unequal and that such unequal treatment in the area of public education is not consistent with the requirement that every state extend its citizens the equal protection of its laws.
The effect of Brown was not the swift desegregation of public schools;
nor was the effect even gradual desegregation. The effect was the creation of methods more subtle yet very effective in achieving separation
of the races. A few private white schools emerged during the period
immediately after Brown, but it was not until the Civil Rights Act of
1964, when the federal government began to take effective measures to
implement desegregation, that the private school movement in the
South began to swell. Becoming exasperated at the continuing use of
devices to thwart desegregation, the Supreme Court in 1968 slightly
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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modified the emphasis of its former decisions. No longer could a state
avoid desegregation by operating a system merely nondiscriminatory on
its face; the state would have to take direct action to bring about integra2
tion in order to eliminate the residual effect of earlier segregation.
Although the Court's statement of the affirmative duty of desegregation
manifested no basic change in policy, lower courts correctly interpreted
this language to mean that they should take a more demanding look at

the effectiveness of school desegregation plans. Thus, a meaningful
amount of desegregation eventually resulted, and the private white
school movement expanded rapidly in the South. Today, the proportion
of children attending such schools in southern states is great enough to
create a significant impact on the public education of both blacks and

whites.

3

Private persons, acting without any state involvement, may dis-

criminate in ways that are forbidden the states by the fourteenth amendment. Also, individual citizens have a constitutional right to attend

private schools. 4 It is the purpose of this Note to evaluate the extent to
which private persons who have formed post-Brown private white

schools in the South have avoided government involvement in their
discriminatory schemes. It is the conclusion of this Note that there has
been and is substantial state action within the condemnation of the
fourteenth amendment in the creation and operation of private white
schools.
II.
A.

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOL SYSTEM

Assistance to Private Schools Coupled with Closing of Local
Public Schools.

Early litigation involving the creation and operation of private
schools frequently had rather obvious overtones of state involvement.
For example, Hall v. St. Helena ParishSchool Board5 involved a statu2. "School boards such as the respondent then operating state compelled dual systems were
nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch. . . . The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968). "[T]he obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
3. In the 1970-71 school year, approximately 450,000 to 500,000 white children attended
private academies; these children represented slightly more than 5% of the total number of white
pupils in southern states. Charleston News & Courier, July 12, 1972, at 12. See also note 109, infra.
4. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
5. 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
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tory scheme perhaps best described as state authorization for the
conversion of a local public school system into a local private school
system. After desegregation orders issued to several parishes, the
Louisiana legislature assembled in special session; the products of
the session included the "local option" law challenged in St. Helena
Parish.This set of statutes, carefully drafted without reference to race,
authorized elections at which the voters of each parish could vote to
close the public school system in that parish and authorized the school
board of each parish to act pursuant to the election. The various enactments also authorized the school board to transfer all public school
realty to private organizations, provided that teachers, bus drivers, and
other school employees employed by private organizations should receive the same salaries received by their public school counterparts, and
authorized the transfer of funds from state general funds to a special
education expense grant fund. The acts also required the parish school
boards to supervise the private schools created in the parish and to
administer the payment of tuition grants to the students attending them.
The three-judge court found that the purpose of the acts was
to provide a means by which public schools under desegregation orders may be
changed to "private" schools operated in the same way, in the same buildings, with

the same furnishings, with the same money, and under the same supervision as the
public schools. In addition, as part of the plan, the school board of the parish where
the public schools have been "closed" is charged with responsibility for furnishing
free lunches, transportation, and grants-in-aid to the children attending the "private" schools.'

Noting the extensive amount of control exercised, financial aid administered, and active participation exercised by the state and parish authorities, and relying heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Cooper v.
Aaron,7 the court held that the scheme violated equal protection because
it was a "transparent artifice" designed to circumvent blacks' "constitutional right to attend desegregated public schools." 8 The court also held
that the scheme violated the equal protection clause "because its application in one parish, while the state provides public schools elsewhere,
would unfairly discriminate against the residents of that parish, irrespective of race."9 Under the principle of St. Helena Parish, a state
6. Id. at 651.
7. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Federal troops had been necessary to maintain order after the integration of public schools and public officials cited the public disorder as justification for their actions
to temporarily delay integration. Held, any state endeavor to delay the right of blacks to a
desegregated public education was unconstitutional.
8. 197 F. Supp. at 651.
9. Id.
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clearly may not statutorily authorize county officials to discontinue the
public school systems in some counties and convert them to private local
school systems.
The situation presented in Griffin v. County School Board of

Prince Edward County'0 was analogous. The difference lay in that there
was no simple conversion of public school property to private school
property, but rather a discontinuance of the public school system in the
county coupled with the creation by private persons of a private school
organization. Prince Edward County public schools had been closed for
several years, although every other county in the state operated public
schools. Shortly after the closing of the local public system a private
group built its own school and operated it for white children only. State
and county tuition grants, payable without regard to race to children
attending private schools, indirectly supported the all-white school. In
addition to the state and county tuition grant legislation, the county
enacted an ordinance allowing a property tax credit for contributions
to private nonsectarian schools in the county; this device also furnished
the private school significant support. After pointing out that the original Prince Edward County desegregation case had been a companion
case of Brown and that Prince Edward County had made no progress
in achieving desegregated public education in the intervening ten years,
the Court held that the district court properly enjoined the payment of
the county tuition grant, the processing of applications for the state
tuition grant, and the granting of the property tax credit. The Court also
held that the district court could require the county to exercise its taxation power and could require Prince Edward County to operate a public
school system comparable to those operated in other Virginia counties.
The Court affirmed the district court holding that "'the public schools
of Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the effect of the
law of the land.

. .

while the Commonwealth of Virginia permits other

public schools to remain open at the expense of the taxpayers.,
Both the St. Helena Parish and Prince Edward County cases were

primarily concerned with the right of black plaintiffs to a desegregated
public education in situations in which local authorities had halted the
functioning of the local public schools. The private school implications
of the two decisions are incidental to that primary concern. Thus, although it was clear under Prince Edward and St. Helena that a state
cannot allow one of its subdivisions to avoid desegregation by ceasing
10. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
11. Id. at 233 (quoting from the district court opinion, Allen v. County School Bd., 207 F.
Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962)).
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its public education function and subsidizing private education, neither
case explicitly denied that the state can assist discriminatory private
schools even in situations in which the private school may have a substantial impact on public education. In order to be consistent with
Brown and Prince Edward, a recalcitrant state faced no more than three
choices: it could abolish the public school system statewide; it could
desegreate its public school system fully; or it could operate a largely
black public school system statewide, supplementing it with assistance
to a system of private white schools in a manner that would not violate
the fourteenth amendment. The first two alternatives were too extreme
for any state. The third alternative emerged as a middle course between
the intolerable extremes, notwithstanding some misgivings about the
legality of the plan caused by the Court's failure to rule explicitly on
the right of states to assist private discriminatory schools.
B. Tuition Grants to Private School Students
Southern states accepted that they could not simply close their
public school systems wherever integration threatened. Instead, they
continued to shoulder the responsibility of maintaining statewide public
education systems and, less nobly, began programs to assist private
white schools, which developed wherever integration appeared imminent. To meet the high cost of private education among those who
frequently could ill afford it, the first expedient adopted by the states
was the tuition grant. Though the stated purpose and the details of such
laws varied, they essentially operated to create a new state agency to
administer a tuition grant program. The state funded the agency out of
general funds; and upon proper application, it paid to the student attending the private school a fixed sum unrelated to the financial need
of the student or the tuition charge of the school.
Opponents of these tuition grant programs quickly challenged them
as unconstitutional state action assisting private discriminators in the
destruction of integrated public education. Early decisions on these laws
were inconclusive in their exact rationale, but courts frequently reached
the same result. In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,2 a threejudge court considered Alabama's authorization of grants to students
attending private nondenominational schools in districts in which no
public school was available. The court stated that "such payments
would be unconstitutional where they are designed to further or have
the effect of furthering said segregation in the public schools."'' 3 The
12.
13.

231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
Id. at 754 (emphasis added). The tuition grant aspect of the case constituted a rather
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court declined to declare the law unconstitutional on its face, but did
declare it unconstitutional as applied to all students who enrolled in
private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. If the greater

issues involved in the Macon County litigation 4 had not obscured the
test used in considering the tuition grant statute, the decision probably
would have become the landmark case in the area of private school
support. It was, however, for a three-judge district court from the
Fourth Circuit to hear litigation focusing solely on tuition grants laws;
and that court applied a more lenient test. The Virginia statute, as was
typical, made no eligibility distinction on racial grounds. The state paid
funds directly to the student, rather than to the school. The court in
Griffin v. State Board of Education (Griffin I)"5 stated that not every

receipt of state money transmitted via students would make the private
school such an instrumentality of the state that the court could impute

its discrimination to the state. The court recognized that the private
school was the primary beneficiary of the tuition grants and rejected the
"child benefit" theory argued by the state. Nevertheless, it held the law

constitutional on its face, but conceded that it could be unconstitutionally applied in particular situations.
Payment of a tuition grant for use in a private school is legal if it does not tend in
a determinative degree to perpetuate segregation. The test is not the policy of the
school, but the measure in which the grant or grants contribute to effect the exclusion on account of race. . . . [T]he extent of such participation determines whether
or not the exclusion is State action . . . . Grants for use in an exclusively "white"
school within or without Virginia would not be disallowed if the money only insubstantially contributed to the running of the school. . . . On the other hand, if the
private school is the creature of, or is preponderantly maintainedby, the grants,
then the operation of the school is State action, and payment of the grants therefor
is a circumvention of the equal protection clause of the Constitution."6

The court buttressed its constitutional holding that the existence of state
action turns upon the amount of state aid received by pointing to the
insignificant portion of the litigation. Macon County was already under court order to desegregate,
and Governor Wallace as Governor and as president of the state board of education had interfered
greatly with local authorities' efforts to implement the federal court orders. The primary question
before the court was whether it merely should enjoin various state officials from future interference
with local school boards or whether the control of state officials in the education process was so
great that the court should place the entire state under desegregation orders. The court held that
it would issue only an injunction against further interference, because it assumed that such an
injunction would be obeyed.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
16. Id. at 565 (emphasis added). In determining whether state support was insubstantial or
preponderant, the court listed several factors to be considered. Among these factors were the ratio
of the state grant to the private school tuition and the ratio of tuition grant students to nontuition
grant students.

1973]

PRIVATE WHITE SCHOOLS

Civil Rights Act of 1964; that statute defines a public school in terms
of operation by the state or operation predominantly through the use
of government funds. The court enjoined state officials from paying
grants to students at certain schools that the court found were preponderantly maintained by tuition grants. However, the court allowed the
state to continue grants to students at other racially discriminatory
schools, having found that such schools were not maintained preponderantly by the grants.
The major failure of the Griffin I decision was that in determining
whether or not there was state action, the court approached the situation
as if the relief sought were an injunction against discrimination by the
private school, rather than only an injunction against payment of the
grants. If a state preponderantly supports a private school, the school
is "public," not "private." If the school is public, an injunction against
discrimination by the school is proper. The "preponderant support" test
of Griffin I seems to be appropriate for determining whether there is
sufficient state action to require the desegregation of a private school.
It is too limited a test to apply properly when the relief sought is an
injunction against only certain forms of state assistance to private discrimination. Clearly, the payment of state funds is state action, regardless of the amount of support those funds provide the private schools.
Although this amount of state action is probably too minimal to justify
an injunction against discrimination by the school, surely it would be
proper for a court to order a state to cease and desist even this support
of private discriminators. The situation presented is one in which there
is clearly private discrimination, and the payment of any amount of
funds in support of private discrimination should be sufficient state
involvement in private discrimination to merit an injunction against that
state involvement. Notwithstanding this weakness of Griffin I, the preponderant support test was the prime standard for several years; and it
7
has some continuing vitality even today.
In a case again primarily important for other reasons, the threejudge court in the second Macon County decision 8 struck down, as
applied, a new Alabama tuition grant law. Unlike the earlier statute,
17. See Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss.), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S.
839 (1972); notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
18. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), affdmem. sub nonz.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). The issue before the court was the same one
involved in Macon County L See note 13 supra. The court noted the ineffectiveness of the injunction to prevent state interference with local boards. In view of the extensive state constitutional
and statutory control of education and the exercise of those powers by the control of funds,
construction, school consolidation, transportation, and pupil and faculty placement, the court
issued a statewide desegregation order.
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eligibility turned not on the closing of public schools but on the parent's
judgment that attendance at public school would be detrimental to his
child's physical and emotional health. Finding that the state had not
advanced "any rational basis" for the law, 9 the court in Macon County
H concluded that Alabama only could have intended it to subvert public
school integration and declared it unconstitutional as applied.
The case that rejected the Griffin I rationale of "preponderant"
support and became the landmark case in tuition grant litigation and
many other areas of private school assistance was Poindexter v. Louis0 The essence of the Poindexter
iana FinancialAssistance Commission."
decision was that any scheme adopted with segregative intent and providing significant support for segregated education is unconstitutional
on its face. The three-judge panel exhaustively surveyed the history of
black education in Louisiana and reviewed the effect of the Louisiana's
tuition grant law. The court's review of Louisiana history included laws
that forbade teaching slaves to read, later laws that required racially
segregated education, and a host of post-Brown laws employing various
devices to close schools under desegregation orders. The instant tuition
grant law was the sequel to this history, and the court felt bound to
construe it in that context. Under the instant law, Louisiana had transferred 2,500,000 dollars from the Public Welfare Fund to the Education
Expense Grant Fund and had authorized the latter fund to appropriate
300,000 dollars per month for tuition grants. Forty-four out of 60 private schools in the state began operating after the first Louisiana desegregation order. Tuition charges for these schools frequently were exactly
the amount authorized to each student under the grant program, and
the tuition charged by the schools changed each time Louisiana altered
the amount payable under the grant program. After the initial Griffin
decision, the Commission had resolved to reduce the amount paid to
students to the extent necessary to preclude the grant program from
being the predominant support of any private school. The court found
that Louiaiana had "established a second system of schools, competitive
with the public school system" and that "[t]he tuition grants damage
Negroes by draining students, teachers, and funds from the desegregated public school system into a competitive, segregated 'quasi-public'
school system."12' The court found that the tuition grant program fur19. Id. at 477. The court indicated that rational bases could include the inadequacy of public
educational facilities, the desire to make private schools equally available to poor persons, or the
desire to advance the educational opportunities of special classes of students, such as the handicapped or the gifted.
20. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
21. Id. at 851.
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nished "almost all" of the funds needed to maintain the post-Brown
schools.
Judge Wisdom noted with approval the decisions in the two Macon
County cases and emphatically rejected the Griffin I test as without
constitutional basis: "But decisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private discrimion do not turn on whether the state aid
adds up to 51 per cent or adds up only to 49 per cent of the support of
the segregated institution. The criterion is whether the state is so
significantly involved in the private discrimination as to render the state
' 22
action and the private action violative of the equal protection clause.
The court contrasted the racially neutral benevolence of the state free
textbook law with the traditional racially biased policy underlying the
tuition grant law, and held that "[t]hepurpose and natural or reasonable
effect of this law are to continue segregated education in Louisiana by
providing state funds for the establishment and support of segregated,
privately operated schools for white children. .

.

.Any affirmative and

purposeful state aid promoting private discrimination violates the equal
protection clause. There is no such thing as the State's legitimately
being just a little bit discriminatory." 3 Recognizing the probability
that Louisiana might continue to support private white schools, the
court then held that "[t]he State is so significantly involved in the discrimination practiced by the private schools in Louisiana that any financial aid from the State to these schools or newly organized schools in
the form of tuition grants or similar benefits violates the equal protection clause ... ."I and declared the law unconstitutional both on its

face and as applied. The court enjoined all payments of tuition grants.
Upon the facts cited by the court, indicating the extensive effect of
the tuition grant program, the decision of the court clearly was correct.
The only weakness of the opinion is that, in the course of 25 pages, it
used widely varying language. Thus, although it apparently adopted a
"significant support coupled with segregative intent" test in condemning
the tuition grant law, the court's failure to rest its decision unequivocally
on that test has led to wide diversity in later cases considering other
means of assistance to private schools; later decisions have split over the
relevance of a segregative purpose and over the amount of support
required to become significant.25
22.
23.

Id. at 854.
Id. at 835 (emphasis added).

24. Id. at 857.
25. See note 69 infra and accompanying text (discussing Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified on other grounds, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973)); note
58 infra and accompanying text (discussing Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss.),
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Other courts, rapidly following the lead of Poindexter,struck down
similar tuition grant provisions. The District Court for South Carolina
held the South Carolina law an unlawful circumvention of Brown because of its "purpose, motive and effect." 8 Louisiana passed another
tuition grant law, this statute having as a stated purpose the prevention
of juvenile delinquency. Under the new law, the amount of assistance
depended on such variables as net family income and the number of
dependents. In Poindexter I1,27 the same three-judge court found these
differences merely superficial and held the law unconstitutional because
of its defective purpose and effect.
The stated purposes of Mississippi's 1964 tuition grant law were to
encourage education of all children and to afford each individual freedom in choosing public or private schooling. Notwithstanding the stated
purposes, the three-judge court in Coffey v. State EducationalFinance

Commission2 held the statute unconstitutional because it "encourages,
facilitates and supports the establishment of a system of private schools
operated on a racially segregated basis as an alternative available to
white students ...."29 The Coffey court traced the social history of
public education in Mississippi from the enactment of the law in 1964,
when there were only three private nonsectarian schools in the state, to
the school year 1967-68, when there were 49 such schools. Each of these
schools except one was all white; they usually had emerged concurrently
with the desegregation of public schools. The court further found that
"state tuition grants have been critical to most of the schools. The
formation and operation of the new schools have been on the thinnest
financial basis. Tuition charges often have been scheduled to coincide
with the quarterly payments of the state grants. Many individual parents
have been either unable or unwilling to pay the balance due above the
amount of the grants. ' 3 The Coffey decision is something of an anomaly, however. Although the court indicated that it was aware of all the
earlier tuition grant decisions, including Poindexter, the court held that
the facts found in Coffey satisfied the Griffin I test because the statute
prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 839 (1972)); note 28 infra and accompanying text (discussing Coffey
v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969)); and note 32 infra and
accompanying text (discussing Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969)).
26. Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.), aff'd per curianm
393 U.S. 222 (1968).
27. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. La.),
affd per curiarn sub nom. Louisiana Educ. Comm'n for Needy Children v. Poindexter, 393 U.S.
17 (1968).
28. 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
29. Id. at 1392.
30. Id.

19731

PRIVATE WHITE SCHOOLS

tended in a determinative degree to perpetuate segregation. The court
did not indicate what it would have done if the tuition grants had constituted only "significant" support instead of "preponderant" support.
This unclarified point has become important3 in later litigation about
other methods of support for private schools.
In Griffin v. State Board of Education,32 a three-judge court reconsidered the Virginia tuition grant law considered in the earlier Griffin
decision in light of the "more exacting test" impliedly endorsed by the
Supreme Court in affirming Poindexter. The court this time found the
entire law unconstitutional on its face.
To repeat, our translation of the imprimatur placed upon Poindexter by the final
authority is that any assist [sic] whatever by the State towards provision of a
racially segregated education, exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution. In our judgment, it follows, that neither motive nor purpose is an indispensable element of the breach. The effect of the State's contribution is a sufficient
determinant ....

Thus, Griffin II broadened the "significant support" aspect of
Poindexter by condemning "any" assistance; although this change is of
some importance, it probably is not of great significance. Indeed, it is
quite likely that a court will hold assistance that is not "significant" to
be de minimis, and thus not any support at all. Griffin 11 also explicitly
is a
rejected the implication of Poindexterthat a "segregative purpose"
3
necessary prerequisite for holding a scheme unconstitutional.
Thus, fifteen years after the Brown decision had fostered the
growth of southern private white schools, these schools suffered a telling
blow when it became clear that tuition grant plans fell within the condemnation of the fourteenth amendment. Yet, because the destruction
of the tuition grant system was not fatal to the movement and because
the tuition grant cases form the framework of much of the later private
school litigation, it is important to examine them as a group in order
to examine both the consistencies and inconsistencies among them. This
is not altogether easy, for the brevity of some opinions and the verbosity
of others obscures their rationales. Only the Griffin, Poindexter, and
Coffey decisions give extensive statements of facts considered relevant
to the condemnation of the grant plans. Such factors were the significance of the ratio between total expense of private school operation and
total amount of indirect subsidization furnished by the grants; the crea31. See Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss.), prob.juris. noted, 409 U.S.
389 (1972) (state provision of free textbooks).
32. 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
33. Id.at 1181.
34. Id.
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tion of private schools simultaneously with the desegregation of public
schools; the similarity between the amount charged by the school and
the amount paid by the state to the students; the similarity between the
dates on which charges were due to the school and the dates grants were
paid by the state; the extent to which charges of the school beyond the
amount paid by the grants were left unpaid by the parents; and the
potentiality of the scheme for having a severely adverse impact on a
desegregated public education system. Assuming that most of these
elements were present in every case, 35 it seems clear that the amount
of support furnished the private schools was sufficient to condemn the
grants regardless of whether the court employed the "preponderant,"
the "significant," or the "any" support test as the standard. Most
courts, however, also mentioned the purpose of the statutes in condemning them. Macon County I implied that either impermissible purpose
alone or impermissible effect alone is sufficient to condemn the statute.
The Poindexter, Poindexter II, and South Carolina State Board of
Education courts implied that both an impermissible purpose and an
impermissible effect are required to invalidate the scheme. The decisions
in Griffin and Coffey implied that purpose is irrelevant. Griffin I
clearly held that purpose is irrelevant. Thus, the importance of the
purpose-effect dichotomy is quite unsettled; there is ample authority
among the tuition grant cases for a variety of positions. Decisions in
later cases reflect this confusion.
One factor common to all the cases, however, is the form of relief.
The court enjoined state support of the private discriminatory action in
each instance. No court enjoined the private discrimination itself or
ordered a private school to desegregate; apparently, no plaintiff ever
asked for this relief, although only a few cases state that plaintiffs
disclaimed seeking such relief. One writer"6 has characterized the tuition grant cases as holding only that unrestricted state grants are unconstitutional in the presence of two conditions: public schools must be
under orders to desegregate, and the grants must have defeated the right
35. Some of these factors are certainly more important than others. Also, the factors listed
are from cases before Griffin II; the standard applied in that case probably makes it almost
impossible to create a tuition grant law that could pass fourteenth amendment muster. Of course,
a law could make eligibility for the grants turn in part upon attendance at a nondiscriminatory
private school; such a restricted grant clearly would withstand constitutional challenge based on
racial grounds, but it would not serve the purpose intended by those legislatures that passed
unrestricted tuition grant laws. Even a restricted tuition grant law may face first amendment
challenge.
36. King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House"-State Tuition Grantsfor Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1971).
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of blacks to desegregated public education because white students transferred to private schools. They did hold at least that; the current problem is the extent to which the rationale is more expansive.
C.

Use of Public Propertyby Private Schools-Acquisition by Lease
or Purchasefor Adequate Consideration

Even before the tuition grant laws were found unconstitutional,
private schools struggled to meet their needs for adequate physical facilities. Although many private white schools secured former homes or
business locations and many operated in buildings owned by churches,
other private school founders turned to their local school boards. These
boards frequently were willing to assist in the creation of private
schools, as many school systems owned property that was not in use and
the members of many boards were relentless in their opposition to racial
mixing. The only federal restriction imposed on the use of public property by private discriminatory schools is the fourteenth amendment: at
some point, use of state property by private persons becomes state
action. The precise location of this point has shifted significantly in
recent years.
With some modifications, the rule used today to control disposition
of state property by both lease and sale to private discriminatory academies is that stated many years ago in another context in Derrington v.
37

Plunmuer:

No doubt a county may in good faith lawfully sell and dispose of its surplus
property, and its subsequent use by the grantee would not be state action. Likewise,

we think that, when there is no purpose of discrimination, no joinder in the enterprise, or reservation of control by the county, it may lease for private purposes
property not used nor needed for county purposes, and the lessee's conduct in
operating the leasehold would be merely that of a private person.'8

In Derrington, a county had leased space in the county courthouse for
use as a cafeteria primarily for the benefit of courthouse users and
personnel. When the lessee refused to serve blacks, plaintiffs sued to
restrain the county from leasing the property unless the lessee would
cease discrimination. The Fifth Circuit noted that the operation did not
satisfy its test because the courthouse basement could not be considered
surplus property not used or needed by the county; the space was an
integral part of the major complex from which the county administered
and supervised public functions. The court also noted that it might be
possible to find a joinder of the county in the enterprise because the
37. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
38. 240 F.2d at 925.
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county furnished water, electricity, heat, and air conditioning to the
tenant. It also noted that there was some doubt whether the county had
reserved control over the tenant's activities. Because the situation did
not satisfy its "unneeded property" test, because county operation of the
courthouse cafeteria would have constituted state action, and because
"the lessee stands in the place of the County," the court affirmed the
district court order enjoining the lessee from discrimination.
The rule prohibiting discrimination by private lessees of state property continued to develop in litigation in noneducational areas. In
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville,9 the court endorsed without question

the proposition that the City could not avoid a finding of state action
by executing a long-term lease of its municipal golf courses." All leases
involve some amount of mutual responsibility and benefit, with both the
tenant and the lessor having continuing interests in and control over
certain aspects of the property. The long-term lease hypothesized in
Hampton emphasized the continuity of the city's interest in the operation of the facilities. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority4 con-

cerned discrimination by the private lessee of a restaurant in a publicly
owned parking garage. The Court noted that the lessee's interest was
tax exempt because the building was state property. The state built and
maintained the garage with public funds; the state used the garage for
public parking; the lessee's restaurant was an integral part of the building; and the lessee received great benefit from the advantageous location
inside the garage building. The Court felt that continuity of the relationships and interest in the property made the Authority a "joint participant" having a symbiotic relationship in the operation of the restaurant.
"[W]hat we hold today is that when a State leases public property in
the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by
the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written
'42
into the agreement itself.
This general rule against allowing discrimination by lessees of public property, which appears to be premised on the continuous, ongoing
39. 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962). In Hampton, the city
already had been enjoined from operating its 2 golf courses on a racially segregated basis. The
city then sold the courses to local golf professionals on terms very favorable to the purchasers.
The deeds contained express reverter clauses under which the courses would revert to the city if
the property ever were used for any purpose other than as golf course. The court held that the
inclusion of the reversionary clauses made the purchasers agents for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.
40. Id. at 321 (dictum).
41. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
42. Id. at 726.
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relationship between the state and the discriminator, is applicable in the
private school situation. In Wright v. City of Brighton,43 the court

noted with approval the district court determination that a lease of
unused public school property to a private discriminatory school for a
two-year period would be unlawful under the Burton and Hampton
rationales. Nevertheless, this rule has not in all cases ended the leasing
of public school property to private schools."
It is in the cases of the sale of public property to private discriminatory schools, however, that the most significant developments have
taken place. There is a special rule, not applicable to other publicly
owned property and to other forms of private discrimination, concerning the sale of public school property to private schools. Courts have
established this extensive control over sales of public property by considerably redefining the term "good faith" as it was used in the Derrington
case. At the very minimum, under general property law principles, good
faith has required that purchases be made for adequate consideration.
As the court indicated in St. Helena Parish, "[T]o the extent that such
conveyances

. . .

are for less than the fair value of the property, they

are gifts constituting continuing state aid to 'private' schools."45 The
general rule pertaining to reservation of control by the state as grantor
is also applicable in the private academy situation. Even such tenuous
control as the inclusion of a reverter clause may make the private
discriminator-grantee subject to the limitations placed on states. In the
Hampton case, the city sold its golf courses subject to reversion if the
grantee ever were to use the property for any other purpose than as a
golf course. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that portion of the Derrington
opinion referring to reservation of control by the governmental unit and
held that the express reverter clause was such a reservation of control
by the city that the interests of the city continued. Because the interest
of the city continued, the court held that the grantees were state agents
subject to the limitations against discrimination generally applicable to
state activities and enjoined the "private" discrimination. Wright v. City
43. 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nona. Hoover Academy, Inc. v. Wright,
404 U.S. 915 (1971).
44. E.g., Brown v. Lutz, 316 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. La. 1970). In Brown, the parties stipulated
that the local school board was leasing unused school buildings to a private school; plaintiff alleged
that the private school was segregated. The court dismissed the suit for lack of standing because
there was no allegation that plaintiff had children attending either public or private schools, that
she had some other connection with such schools, or that she had sustained financial loss. Id. at
1097-98.
45. Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. La. 1961), affdper
curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
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of Brighton" and McNeal v. Tate County School District47 indicate,

however, that there are special rules, not applicable in the broader class
of general sales of state property, applicable to the sale of state property
to private academies. The special rules pertaining to sales to private
schools are quite stringent.
In Wright, the city of Brighton bought the school property in question when Jefferson County stopped using the building as part of the
county school system; the city never used the building during the three
years between its purchase and sale. Upon learning that a private white
school that had been functioning locally for six years was interested in
the property, the city council authorized a lease for two years with an
option to renew or purchase. Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin both the
leasing and the selling of the property. The district court found that a
lease of the property would be unconstitutional. The city then authorized the immediate disposition of the building; the property was appraised by three appraisers and purchased by the private school for the
highest of the appraised values. The district court, relying on
Derrington,held that the sale of the building was not a violation of any
of plaintiff's rights. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Pointing out that the
relief sought was not the integration of the private school but an injunction against the sale of land to it, the court considered irrelevant the
protestations of the city that there was no continuous or ongoing relationship and that there was no retained interest or control. The court
noted that "it is the sale alone, not the city's involvement in the operation of the academy," that was at issue. Examining the facts before it,
the court found that
the City of Brighton's determination to sell a public school building to an institution
which the city knew would operate an all-white segregated school had the ultimate
effect of placing a special burden on the black citizens of that community. The city
in effect encouraged the maintenance of a segregated facility by its action. It
participated in a transaction by which a public building, once open to all on an
equal basis, was converted into a segregated facility where the black people of the
community were no longer welcome. 8

Citing numerous Supreme Court decisions from other contexts, the
court held that the sale of property to a segregated private school under
these circumstances is unconstitutional as a badge of slavery. The Fifth
Circuit remanded the case for disposition consistent with its opinion,
clearly indicating that the sale should be rescinded.
46.
U.S. 915
47.
48.

441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Hoover Academy v. Wright, 404
(1971).
460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1971).
441 F.2d at 451.
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The rationale of Wright is applicable to the sale of property owned
by any governmental unit; in the limited context of property owned by
public school authorities, this tough new rule was tightened even further
by McNeal. Reviewing the facts found by the district court, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the school in question consisted of four buildings on
a rural six-acre tract; that after almost 30 years of use, the buildings
were badly delapidated; that in the final year of use by the school board,
35 children of both races attended the school; that only three of its seven
classrooms were used during that year; that the school board determined
that continued operation would be uneconomical; that the school board
advertised the property for sale for three consecutive weeks in a local
newspaper as required by state law; that the only bid was from an
individual who soon reconveyed to the Tate County Foundation; and
that it was the goal of the Foundation to establish an all-white private
school. The court also noted that school board members were cognizant
of a movement afoot in the county to start a private school. The dissent
pointed out several additional facts found by the district court: the
school board had acted in good faith in all respects; the school district
had not needed the property in question since the district was reorganized fifteen years earlier; the board closed the school not to avoid integration, but for sound economic reasons; the rural tract had no commercial value; and the Foundation had spent 20,000 dollars to repair the
property after its acquisition, in addition to substantial amounts of free
labor donated by persons interested in the Foundation. The court conceded that the board sold the school for valid reasons, that the price
received was adequate, and that the board in no way affirmatively participated in the creation of the all-white school. The court then characterized the case as identical with Wright, except for "slight variations."
The only variation noted by the court was that in Wright the city had
known that the purchaser planned to operate an all-white school on the
property, whereas in McNeal the school board had no such knowledge.
The court held this distinction "inconsequential" because board members were aware of the private school movement in their county and
state. The court would not permit Wright to be circumvented by allowing a board to ignore local conditions and then plead lack of knowledge.
Noting that since the New Kent County case49 school boards had been
under an affirmative duty to take whatever steps necessary to bring
about a unitary public education system, the court found that the failure
of Tate County officials to reasonably investigate prospective purchas49.

Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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ers conflicted with that affirmative duty and amounted to a provision
of "aid to a scheme which resulted in more-not less-segregation.""0
The court indicated that the type of inquiry required would vary
with the facts of each particular case, and it did not detail a standard
of inquiry. The court initially reversed and remanded with directions to
invalidate the sale and to reconvey the land to the school board. On
motion for rehearing, the court modified its disposition by directing the
district court to sustain the validity of the sale to the Foundation and
to enjoin the use of the property on a discriminatory basis. The court
stated that the property, if used as a private school, must be operated
without discrimination as to race and must "be open at all times to all
qualified applicants." In denying the motion for rehearing, the court
again enunciated its strict policy concerning disposition of school property. s '
In a post-McNeal case involving the sale of abandoned public
school property, District Judge Smith held that the rights of the school
board, the purchaser, and black citizens could be protected best by a
clause under which the property would revert to the school board if it
were used by a discriminatory private school during a ten-year period
immediately following the sale. 2 A man and wife partnership sought to
purchase the abandoned property for use in their farming operations;
they planned to use the facilities for office, warehouse, and shop space,
and they specifically disclaimed any desire to direct the use of the land
to private schools. The partners preferred a fully unencumbered title,
but stated that they would accept a deed containing a reverter clause
limited to ten years. Judge Smith ordered the school board to include
such a clause in the deed.
Thus, it appears that even when adequate value is given, the use of
any public property by a private school discriminator-lessee is constitutionally impermissible. Similarly, the use of any formerly public property by a private school discriminator-grantee is constitutionally impermissible if the vendor is aware of the vendee's intent. In the Fifth Circuit, there is almost a per se rule that a private school discriminator
cannot lease or purchase public school property for use in the operation
50. 460 F.2d at 572.
51. "It appears to be appropriate to express a caveat to courts who in the future may have
to consider the sale of public school property for use as a private school. Such a sale should be
scrutinized with the utmost care and caution to the end that public school property shall not be
converted to use by private schools which engage in forbidden discriminatory practices." Id. at
574-75.
52. Taylor v. Coahoma County School Dist., 345 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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of a private academy. 3 The clarity of these rules, however, is no indication that they will be obeyed. Control of tuition grant laws in a dozen
states was a simple task compared to the problem of policing each
property disposition of thousands of local school authorities. 4 There

will be much more litigation in this field simply to enforce rights that
are clear already.

Even though it may take years to enforce the law in

the area of public property disposition to private schools, an examination of the relief given in these cases nevertheless indicates a peculiarly

potent threat to private school discrimination. In contrast to the tuition
grant cases, in which the court enjoined only the state assistance, most
of the public property cases have enjoined the discriminationitself This
was true in all the lease cases examined; it was also true in McNeal,
which to that extent abrogates the sale rescission relief indicated by

Wright. It appears that private white schools which use public property
will be on the horns of dilemma: they may either integrate or close. Each

alternative equally defeats their intended purpose.
53. The Fifth Circuit has expanded the McNeal rule to apply to lease arrangements. Graves
v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972). It appears, however, that this
expansion is not very significant. Since there is already a general rule condemning leases of any
public property to a private discriminator, the imposition of an affirmative duty to investigate the
uses a lessee would make of public school property is hardly necessary in order to hold such leases
unconstitutional.
54. For example, the private Baker Academy was founded in Baker County, Georgia in
1970, when its 38 pupils attended class in a ramshackle building. Over a 2-year period, the county
school board sold to the Academy various "surplus" items, including 20 desks for $200, 4 late
model school buses for $850, and the newest school building in the system for $6500. The building
conveyed had been built in 1955 for $125,000. Three hundred twenty-five white pupils attended
Baker Academy in its new facility, while 107 white and 701 black pupils attended school in the 2
remaining public schools, both of which were of Depression Era construction. Children of 3
members of the 5-man school board attended the Academy. NEWSWEEK, March 27, 1972, at 70.
The problem of policing is further complicated by the fact that the use of publicly owned
property by private schools is frequently not very visible even among potential black plaintiffs who
reside in the locality. For example, public property not closely connected physically with government building complexes easily could be sold to private schools; the transaction would be especially
invisible if the property were undeveloped. There is no clear indication that the Wright and McNeal
rules apply to undeveloped property, but there is no indication that they do not apply. All the cases
to date have involved the disposition of developed property formerly open to the public at some
time. Future litigation will involve undeveloped property, and the same rules should apply. Their
application would not be mandatory, because there would be no conversion of a formerly nondiscriminatory publicfacility to a discriminatory private one. The basic prohibition against assistance
to private discriminators clearly is still applicable, however, even in situations involving undeveloped property.
55. Months after the demanding McNeal decision, the Fifth Circuit still was hearing similar
cases. The Justice Department sought recission of the Baker County conveyance, see note 54 supra,
and the district court dismissed the suit because Baker County was in another district. Atlanta
Constitution, May I1, 1972, at 11-A. United States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972),
reversed the district court dismissal.
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Use of Publicly-Owned Chattels GratuitouslyAcquired

Modern school systems require the use of great amounts of personal property, including textbooks, libraries, teaching aids, and desks.
Private schools, if they are to be at all effective for educational purposes,
must have an adequate supply of these materials. The proper bounds of
state assistance to private discriminatory academies via the mechanism
of allowing use of public chattels is an area not yet determined definitely. Most of the litigation to date has involved the use of public
textbooks by or the gratuitous transfer of benefits to private schools.
There almost certainly will be more litigation involving other forms of
property and nongratuitous methods of conferring benefits. Even in the
area of gratuitous transfer of textbooks, there is not much clarity.
States clearly have the power to extend some forms of assistance
to pupils in private schools, under the theory that the child and not the
school is the primary beneficiary and that expenditure of state funds to
benefit children is a public purpose. Under Cochran v. Louisiana State
6
Board of Education,"
one form of assistance to private school pupils
that the state may provide is the furnishing of textbooks. States have
taken advantage of the child benefit theory of Cochran to provide textbooks to students at many private discriminatory academies. Litigation
has been recurring, but many cases have been decided on procedural
grounds57 without reaching the substantive issue-resolution of the conflict between permissible benefit to the private school child and the
impermissible subsidization of a private school alternative to integrated
public schools. Nevertheless, the frequency with which the issue arises
is a measure of the prevalence of providing pupils at discriminatory
academies with state-purchased materials. The only court to reach the
merits of the problem sustained such a law.
56. 281 U.S. 370 (1930). In Cochran, state law required the expenditure of state funds to
provide books to all school children, regardless of whether they attended private or public school.
This practice was challenged as a deprivation of property without due process under the theory
that the taking was for a private and not a public purpose. The Court sustained the law, quoting
extensively from the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion for the proposition that the children and
the state, and not the private schools, were the only beneficiaries of this plan to improve education
inthe state.
57. E.g., Brown v. Lutz, 316 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. La. 1970), in which the parties stipulated
that the local public school authorities furnished textbooks and other supplies to private schools.
This action was taken pursuant to the very statute upheld in Cochran. In United States v. Tunica
County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affdper curiam, 440 F.2d 377 (5th
Cir. 1971), intervenors challenged the action of the board allowing private school pupils to continue
using state texts issued to them during the previous semester when they attended public school.
The court dismissed this portion of the suit as moot, the books having been returned to public
school officials by the time the court rendered the decision.
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In Norwood v. Harrison,8 the court faced a Mississippi textbook
law dating from the 1940's, a law clearly passed for educational and not
racial reasons. Under the law, the state provided all school children free
texts regardless of race and regardless of whether the child attended a
public, private, or parochial school. Black plaintiffs attacked this law
as applied to those students attending racially segregated private schools
established after 1964, the date of the first substantial school desegregation in Mississippi. The constitutional challenge was that assistance to
pupils at such schools conflicted with the affirmative duty of public
school officials to achieve a unitary public school system. The threejudge panel approached the issue in a manner novel in the civil rights
context. It noted that the law was constitutional under the first amendment as applied to parochial school students, that the books were furnished to students and not to schools, and that the Supreme Court
continually had distinguished between "permissible state aid to the student and impermissible state aid to the church-related school." In the
court's opinion, the question then became whether a "more stringent"
standard should apply in the fourteenth amendment cases than in first
amendment cases. 9 The court concluded that a more stringent test
should not apply and sustained the application of the law to late-vintage
private white academies. It distinguished the tuition grant cases, saying
that the laws involved in those cases were critical to and fostered the
development of private academies because of the vital financial support
given them. In the court's opinion, this was not true of the textbook law.
The court did admit that 34,000 children attended segregated private
schools, however, and furnishing texts to that many persons seems significant by Poindexter and Griffin II standards. The court also noted
that the segregative pupose of the tuition grant laws was lacking, ignoring the fact that Griffin II held purpose irrelevant. The Norwood court
concluded by saying:
We find it wholly illogical to require an alteration in the state's textbook program
simply because of the advent of more private schools following the desegregation
of the public school system. Depriving any segment of school children of state-

owned textbooks at this point in time is not necessary for the establishment or
maintenance of state-wide unitary schools. . . . There is no showing that any child
enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would withdraw from
private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools, now unitary. 0

Whether Norwood reached the proper result or not, its first amendment rationale hardly seems appropriate. First, the first amendment
58. 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 839 (1972).
59. Id. at 1011.
60. Id. at 1013.
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does not embody a single concept, as Norwood seems to suggest; rather,
it contains both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
Plaintiffs have based challenges against state assistance to pupils at
parochial schools on the establishment clause; yet courts frequently have
allowed this assistance because failure to allow it would infringe on the
individual's rights under the free exercise clause. In short, whether the
aid to the pupil is constitutional in the religious context requires a
careful balancing of considerations under both the establishment and
free exercise clauses. Constitutional considerations in the racial context
are altogether different, for the equal protection clause is a unitary
concept. If the equal protection clause is to be analogized to the first
amendment at all, it would prohibit only the establishment of discrimination and not the thwarting of free exercise of discrimination. Thus,
striking down state assistance to pupils at discriminatory schools would
not involve the frustration of any of their rights. The conflicting values
in the religious context are child benefit and free exercise versus establishment of religion; the values in the racial context are child benefit
versus the subversion of integrated public education. This difference
between the racial and religious contexts is crucial. Secondly, because
the first amendment protects specific freedoms, such as religion, and
because the equal protection clause gives far more general protection,
the latitude given the states in the first amendment religious context is
not appropriate in the equal protection context.
Even under its inappropriate first amendment analogy, the court
indicated that it might have reached a different result had more persuasive evidence been presented to it on the issue of whether furnishing
free textbooks encourages attendance at segregated academies.6 Encouragement, however, is a very difficult thing to prove. It would seem
more appropriate to focus on the significance of the support indirectly
given private schools, which is the approach mandated by such cases as
Poindexter and Griffin I. Most courts probably would have found
substantial support involved in furnishing free textbooks to 34,000 pupils at private academies in Mississippi, for those pupils constituted more
than six percent of the school population of the state. The Norwood
court was of a different persuasion.
E.

Subsidization of Private School Teachers

Once capital outlay for the physical plant is complete, the school's
most important item of expense is teachers' salaries. This is true of
61.

Id.
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private as well as public schools. Because of the size of this continuing
expense item, private schools have tried a number of ways to secure
government financial assistance to meet the burden. As part of the early

massive resistance programs in which public schools closed in the face
of court-ordered desegregation, it was common for state legislatures to
include as part of their resistance programs a statute authorizing governmental units to pay salaries of private school teachers in locations

in which the public schools were closed. St. Helena Parishis an example
of those cases striking down private school teacher salary laws. Such

schemes constituted obvious state support of private discriminatory
academies and could not claim protection under the child benefit theory
of Cochran. Such support is also clearly significant by the standards

applied in the tuition grant cases. Because these difficulties are virtually
insurmountable, state legislatures gave up their attempts to pay full

salaries. Apparently the payment of salary supplements to private
school teachers remains untried and unlitigated. Seemingly, any salary
supplement large enough to fulfill the legislative purpose of private
school subsidization would run afoul of the same facts that condemned
2
the payment of full salaries.1
The legislative struggle leading to the passage of a recent Louisiana
private school salary law reveals the conflict between the old and new

South. A New Orleans newspaper reported 3 that after a muchpublicized nondiscrimination clause and a section prohibiting aid to
62. Less preplanned methods have been used to pay salaries of private school teachers.
United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affd per
curiain, 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971). As part of a prior desegregation plan, the district court had
entered an order stating that reassignment of teachers to accomplish faculty desegregation was not
dependent on the desire of the teachers or the district, and that contracts interfering with reassignment would be invalid. The 1969-70 contracts reserved to the district the right to reassign teachers
and reserved to teachers the right to terminate the contract in the event of reassignment. During
the first semester of the 1969-70 school year, the court ordered reassignment of white teachers to
predominantly black schools; the teachers submitted resignations effective at the end of the first
semester. Before the start of the second semester, the district announced that it would pay the
resigned teachers their salaries for the remainder of the year; a lump sum payment of almost
$52,000 was made to 18 of the teachers. When the second semester started, 80% of the white pupils
who had attended public school the first semester attended a private school operated by 3 local
churches. The church school charged no tuition and paid no salaries; 18 of its 21 teachers were
those who had resigned from public schools. The United States sued to recover for the district the
funds appropriated for the second semester salaries of the resigned teachers. The 3-judge panel
noted that after word spread that second semester salaries would be paid to resigned teachers, they
"naturally 'gravitated' " to the new school. The court held the payment of salaries to resigned
teachers unconstitutional because "[t]he actions of the school board were a major, if not the
dominant, influence in making it possible for a segregated private school to function on short
notice." Id. at 1026. See note 57 supra for other aspects of the case.
63. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 7, 1970, at 12.
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schools that had been in operation less than three years were dropped
from the bill, pro-integration Catholic supporters of the bill reported
that other supporters of the bill had assured them that segregated private schools would not benefit from the law. Yet the principal sponsor
of the bill stated that teachers were eligible so long as they taught in
private or parochial schools. The private school salary law as finally
enacted was declared violative of the state constitution in Seegers v.
Parker." The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the law required the
state to pay qualified teachers at approved nonpublic schools an amount
equal to that received by similarly qualified public school teachers, but
that the payment would be made only for the teaching of secular subjects. The court noted that fifteen percent of the pupils in the state
attended nonpublic schools and that 69 percent of the eligible nonpublic
schools were religiously related, 31 percent being nonreligious. It noted
that almost 6,800 teachers were eligible for funding, 22 percent of whom
were in nonreligious schools. In spite of the limitation of the law to
payment for teaching secular subjects, the court found that it violated
a Louisiana constitutional provision against establishment of religion
and another provision against aid to religion. Also, the court invalidated
the law as it applied to nonsectarian private schools. Finding that the
law provided an indirect form of support for private schools, the court
held that "[s]ection 13 of Article 12 is explicit: 'No appropriation of
public funds shall be made to any private or sectarian school. * * *'.
The prohibition is against any appropriation-direct or indirect-to any
non-public school. 615 Other state constitutions are not as strict as
Louiaiana's. Nevertheless, the difficulty of passing a private school
teacher salary law that will withstand fourteenth amendment challenge
explains why other states have largely abandoned this method of private academy support.
F.

TransportationBenefits to Private Academies

In the context of the religion clauses of the first amendment, it is
clear that some forms of state assistance in the transportation of parochial school students is permissible."6 There has been very little litigation on transportation aid to segregative academies, and what little
exists is not definitive or broad in scope. In Pettaway v. County School
Board,7 the court faced a Virginia statute authorizing transportation
64. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
65. Id. at 1066, 241 So. 2d at 222.
66. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
67. 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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grants payable to students who were not attending public schools. Finding that the factual circumstances in Surrey County were so similar to
those involved in the Supreme Court's PrinceEdward County decision
that the situations were merely "variations upon the same theme," the
court enjoined payment of transportation grants because they were unconstitutional as administered. Although the case of Brown v. Lutz68
dealt with a stipulation that local authorities provided transportation of
private school pupils to their schools, the court reached no decision on
the merits. It appears likely that there will be future litigation defining
the scope of the state's power to assist private schools in this and other
"marginal" areas of operation. Because the transportation of private
school students hardly has the same direct impact on their education as
does the providing of textbooks, however, it appears that transportation
benefits will have a more difficult time passing constitutional muster.
Here, as in Norwood, whether the law is a late vintage attempt to
frustrate public school integration or an early vintage attempt to assure
that all school children are able to get to their schools may be crucial.
G.

Benefits to NoneducationalActivities

Gilmore v. City of Montgomery69 involved a motion for supple-

mental relief in an action brought over a decade earlier to achieve
desegregation of public recreational facilities. By the date of the suit,
the city was providing football, basketball, and baseball facilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all private groups that applied; among the
many groups using the facilities were private white academies. The relief
sought on the supplemental motion was an injunction against the use
of the facilities by these schools. District Judge Johnson noted that
sports activities by private white schools constitute an important public
relations aspect of their programs and that athletic activities are vital
to the public acceptability of the schools. Operating from a premise that
the sports programs are vitally important, the judge stated that the
situation was not distinguishable from the tuition grant situation. Judge
Johnson viewed those cases as holding that in situations in which schools
were under a duty to desegregate, any state assistance to private schools
that frustrated the right of blacks to a public, integrated education was
unconstitutional assistance. The court found that the availability of
public recreational facilities to private white academies has the effect of
"encouraging and facilitating" their establishment, because such availa68.
69.

316 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. La. 1970); see note 44 supra.
337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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bility enables schools to enhance their public image more easily via
sports programs. Judge Johnson ruled that because the availability of
facilities encourages the creation of private academies, and because
private academies drain talent, funds, and interest from the public
school system and thereby endanger the rights of blacks, the availability
of the facilities was unconstitutional. "Thus, this Court concludes from
Griffin [II] that what is important is the effect the state's aid has on the
maintenance of a racially balanced public school system, but that the
extent of the aid provided is immaterial. . . Even if one assumes,
however, that the degree of aid is relevant, the aid provided in the
present case is substantial and it significantly affects the Montgomery
public school system. '7 The quantitative substantiality of the aid lay in
the facts that the private schools saved the considerable expense of
constructing their own stadiums and gyms and that they gained considerable revenue from the sale of tickets for and refreshments at sporting
contests. Judge Johnson ruled that it was no defense that the facilities
were open to all on a nondiscriminatory basis; he stated that the issue
was whether their availability endangered the viability of integrated
public education. Because the plan endangered the public system, the
court enjoined the city from allowing discriminatory private schools to
use city recreational facilities.
Because Gilmore and Norwood are the two most recent decisions
based on the tuition grant cases, a brief comparison of them is revealing.
The tuition grant cases hold at least that significant state aid to private
discriminatory academies is unconstitutional; significance of the aid is
determined by examining both the quantitative amount received by private schools and the qualitative effect on public schools. Seemingly,
furnishing free textbooks to over 30,000 private school pupils-the practice upheld in Norwood-over an entire state is quantitatively more
significant than allowing private schools in one city to use recreational
facilities generally available to the public-the practice invalidated in
Gilmore. The qualitative effect on public education in both cases is
indirect and appears to be of the same nature-the aid encourages
students and public interest to gravitate away from the public system.
If only these factors are considered, the results should have been consistent. The difference may turn on two factors, either or both of which
may be the basis for the conflicting results. First, it is possible that the
different philosophies of the three-judge panel in Norwood and Judge
Johnson in Gilmore made them unequally subject to persuasion by the
70.

Id. at 24-25.
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plaintiffs' arguments. Secondly, consistent decisions would have had a
decidedly different impact on the education of children in private
schools. Denying Montgomery's private schools the use of city recreational facilities may have an adverse effect on their athletic programs,
but it would not endanger the quality of their education directly. On the
other hand, although depriving Mississippi private school children of
state texts may encourage some of them to return to public schools, it
seems equally likely that many would remain in private schools and use
inferior texts or none at all. This would endanger their education. On
the basis of their different impacts on the education of private school
children and the interest of the nation in seeing that all persons receive
basic materials for education, perhaps the decision are reconcilable.
H. State Income and Property Tax Benefits
The benefits received by private schools under tax laws are based
on policy values different from the values underlying the benefits received under the laws discussed above. The tax statutes are laws of
general application, and their impact on private school education
usually is the product of a general benevolence toward charitable institutions. Most of the benefits previously discussed were conferred under
laws limited to the field of education; state and local governments frequently adopted such laws especially for the benefit of private schools
in order to make them more feasible alternatives to integrated public
education. Notwithstanding the differences in the intent behind and
specificity of the laws, the tax statutes of most states do have a significant impact on private schools.
The expenses of most segregated academies usually exceed income;
few private schools operate at a profit. For this reason, the state income
tax laws have little impact on private schools as taxpayers. Because
most of the schools own the premises on which they operate, however,
the state property tax laws are important. Most states grant exemptions
to property owned by religious, charitable, educational, and similar
institutions. Although there apparently has been no litigation on the
subject, it appears that most states in the South readily apply these
exemptions to private white schools. Such exemptions will not necessarily save discriminatory organizations from taxes on their property, however. For example, the Elks Lodge limits its membership to Caucasians.
Oregon tax law exempts the property of fraternal organizations from
taxation, defining fraternal organizations in such a way that they must
be charitable. A three-judge district court, in Falkenstein v. Department
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of Revenue,7' declared this exemption unconstitutional. The panel found
that a "symbiotic relationship" existed between the state and the lodges
because their exemption was based upon the assumption that the lodges
performed services that the state otherwise would perform; the exemption and charitable services thus constituted mutual benefits involving
the state in the discrimination. By accepting the tax exemption, the
Lodge became obligated to comply with the equal protection clause; the
state was under a duty to see that the Elks met their obligation. If the
Supreme Court leaves the Oregon district court decision undisturbed,
this rationale almost certainly will be employed in litigation attacking
exemptions for private white educational institutions. Application of the
Falkenstein principle almost certainly would lead to the invalidation of
property tax exemptions for discriminatory schools.
Although private schools as taxpayers have not been affected significantly by state tax laws, those laws have benefited private schools
in another manner. Individual taxpayers receive tax deductions and
credits for contributions made to private, discriminatory schools. This
is especially true of state income taxes. The procedure benefits both the
individual taxpayer and the school; it remains unchallenged, although
it may lead to future attacks similar to those on federal income tax
deductions.72 States and localities may also use property tax credits for
contributions to private schools; such an arrangement existed in the
Prince Edward County situation, when the Court found it unconstitutional in the particular factual context. 73 Local governments may have
attempted this use of property tax credits in other counties in the South,
but there has been little litigation specifically on the subject.
III.

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THROUGH TAX
LAWS

A.

Charitable Contribution Deduction

Federal income tax statutes allow a deduction from gross income
for a "charitable contribution," which is defined in part as "a contribution or gift to or for the use of.

.

.[a] corporation, trust, or community

71. 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972). The district court denied the Elks' motion to intervene;
the Elks appealed from this ruling, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Oregon State Elks Ass'n v. Falkenstein, U.S. (1973). The Department of
Revenue has not appealed the district court judgment.
72. See text accompanying notes 83-99 infra.
73. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964); see text accompanying note 10
supra.
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chest, fund, or foundation

. . .

organized and operated exclusively for

religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes
"74

The estate and gift taxes allow similar deductions. 5 Much of the
law interpreting the income tax deduction is equally applicable to the
estate and gift tax law, but this Note will consider only the income tax
deduction. The purposes enumerated by the statute are disjunctive; the
ambiguity of each of the purposes varies, with the charitable purpose
clearly being the most vague. The relationship of the purposes to each
other may be interpreted in two ways. First, the terms can be construed
noscitur a sociis, by which interpretation each term gives color and
meaning to every other term. By this interpretation, contribution to an
"educational" purpose is not deductible unless the purpose is also
"charitable." Practically every writer considering the applicability of
the deduction to segregated academies has interpreted the statute in this
manner. On the other hand, the statutory purposes can be interpreted
under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under such an

interpretation, contributions to an "educational" purpose would be deductible even though no "charitable" purpose is served. Practically no
writer has chosen to interpret the statute in this fashion. Because the
argument most frequently made against the deduction for contributions
to segregated academies is that they are not charitable, the importance
of the difference in the two methods of statutory interpretation is obvious. Actually, however, contributions to such schools should not be
deductible under either interpretation.
B.

The Significance of the Federal Tax Benefit

Segregated private schools have benefited to some extent by receiving donations for which the contributors received tax deductions, but
there is controversy about the significance of the benefit. An Auburn
University researcher studying Alabama private academies found that
donations furnish only an insignificant portion of the operating expenses
of such schools; tuition provides 85 percent of operating costs, schoolsponsored activities provide six percent, and donations provide eight
percent.76 On the other hand, testimony by private school officials shows
that donations are very important in the capitalization of schools. 77 The
74. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c). Section 501 gives the institution receiving the gifts a
tax exemption. Because private schools rarely make a profit, the exemption is significant only for
its correlation to the donor's deduction privilege.
75. Id. at §§ 2055, 2522.
76. Birmingham News, Aug. 27, 1970, at 2.
77. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970), and Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
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availability of the charitable deduction may move wealthy persons to
make contributions, but the availability of the standard deduction
means that the median income person making small contributions does
not value the deductibility of his contribution. Perhaps the best indication of the importance of the federal tax benefit to white academies is
that after the benefit has been lost, schools have sued to regain it.7"
C.

The Evolution of Internal Revenue Service Policy79

Although the nation always has had segregated private schools in
all levels of education, it was not until segregated southern academies
began to thrive that it became important for the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether such schools qualified for benefits under sections 170 and 501. From 1965 to 1967, the IRS declared a freeze on the
processing of applications for section 501 exemptions while it reviewed
the legal issues involved. From 1967 to 1970, the Service denied exemptions under section 501 and deductions under section 170 only if the
school involved operated with a discriminatory policy and its involvement with local government made its operation unconstitutional. Under
this policy, there had to be state involvement in the school that constituted state action. Further, the Service accepted as prima facie proof
of a nondiscriminatory policy statements published by the schools; no
investigation was made into the validity of the claim of nondiscrimination. 0 In the face of suit in 1970, the IRS was involved in political
wrangling with the White House, the Departments of Justice and
Health, Education, and Welfare, and southern Republicans when the
Service attempted to reformulate its segregated academy policy.8' The
Service eventually reformulated its policy to require educational institutions seeking tax benefits to be charitable in the common-law sense; the
school could not discriminate. The Service dropped the state action
requirement. This policy prevails today, though the IRS is still reluctant
to make independent investigations to substantiate school claims of
nondiscrimination. Very recently, the IRS has announced that admission of minority students alone will not necessarily qualify schools for
tax privileges; additionally, the school must publicize its nondiscriminatory policy thoroughly among all racial segments of the community
78. E.g., Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Connally, 343 F. Supp. 495 (M.D.
Ala. 1972). The Foundation failed to regain its tax benefits.
79. Except where otherwise noted, the data in this section is extracted from the texts of Green
v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), and Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.),
affd men. sub non. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
80. Washington Post, July 11, 1970, at Al.
81. Washington Post, July 6, 1970, at A19.
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that it serves. 82 This recent statement appears directed toward private
colleges and traditional preparatory schools, however, and its significance for recent vintage segregated academies is not great.
One defect in the IRS policy has been the ease with which schools
have been able to receive tax benefits by merely stating that they are
nondiscriminatory. Statements published in local newspapers usually
have been sufficient to prove that a school is not discriminatory, although the facts may have shown the contrary. The IRS is in an awkward position for which it is ill equipped: it must attempt to enforce
broad social policy on recalcitrant segregationist taxpayers, although it
is structured to operate on the premise that American taxpayers obey
the laws and tell the truth. Another defect is the lack of retroactivity of
revocation of exemptions and deductions. This defect means that no tax
is paid on many significant capital contributions because the school is
considered eligible at the time of the donation and the IRS only later
establishes that the school is not eligible. This appears to be an inevitable but unfortunate result of the method of administration of our tax
laws.
D. Court Interpretation of the Validity of Federal Tax Benefits to
DiscriminatoryAcademies
The ease with which the IRS before 1970 extended federal tax
benefits led to a taxpayers' suit challenging the validity of benefits to
private white academies in Mississippi. Plaintiffs in Green v. Kennedy83
contended that certain statutory requirements under sections 170 and
501 were not met, that the benefits violated section 2000(d) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and that the benefits were unconstitutional because
they supported private white schools that subverted the rights of blacks
to integrated public education. Because the preliminary question in
Green was limited to the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction
against conferring the benefits, the three-judge panel in its initial opinion considered only the jurisdictional issue: whether a colorable constitutional claim could be based upon the extension of the statutory exemption to segregated private schools that operate without state involvement. The court adopted the Coffey v. State Educational Finance
Commission84 holding that such schools in Mississippi operated as alternatives to unitary public schools and found substantial proof that federal tax benefits were very important to both the capitalization and
82.
83.
84.

Wall Street J., Dec. 13, 1972, at I, col. 5.
309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969). See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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operational stages of the Mississippi schools. Acknowledging that Congress had not conferred the tax benefits with an intent to foster discrimination, the court considered the lack of intent irrelevant: "The issue of
purpose may be decisive in demonstrating unconstitutionality when a
government purpose to foster segregation is affirmatively shown, but the
lack of segregative purpose on the part of the Government does not
avoid the constitutional issue if the Government action materially supports a program of school segregation. 8' 5 The court found that tax
benefits provided indirect, yet very material, support. Green I thus rejected the IRS position, finding that federal tax benefits were unconstitutional even though there was no state involvement in the operation of
the schools. The court held that because the federal government was
8 "[it]
under a duty to promote unitary schools under Bolling v. Sharpe,"
is not constitutionally free to frustrate the only constitutionally permissible state policy, of a unitary school system, by providing government support for endeavors to continue under private auspices the kind
of racially segregated dual school system that the state formerly supported." 87 The court enunciated a standard for determining the constitutionality of benefits that is more than slightly reminiscent of standards
employed in the tuition grant cases: "[Tihe validity of tax exemption
and deductibility of contributions are to be determined on the basis of
(1) their practical tendency to increase the incidence of private discrimination, and (2) whether the discrimination so augmented frustrates the
exercise of fundamental liberties." 8 Because the court found that tax
benefits increase the incidence of private schools, and because such
schools in Mississippi tended to undermine the right of blacks to integrated public education, the court temporarily enjoined the IRS from
conferring such benefits until it had "affirmatively" determined that the
applying school was not part of a system of private white schools operated as an alternative to desegregated public schools.
The Green I litigation continued in Green v. Connally (Green II),19

in which the court reached the merits of the controversy. The panel
acknowledged that the IRS had changed its policy so that private
schools that discriminated no longer had favored tax status, but concluded that the issue was not moot because of the instability of administrative rulings. The court then construed the statute noscitur a sociis and
85. 309 F. Supp. at 1136.
86. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in the public schools of the District of
Columbia violative of fifth amendment due process).
87. 309 F. Supp. at 1137.
88. Id. at 1136.
89. 330 F. Supp.l150 (D.D.C. 1971).
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found that institutions operated for educational purposes were not exempt unless they were charitable. The court analogized to the law of
charitable trusts to determine whether racially discriminatory trusts
were charitable. It concluded that such trusts at one time were considered charitable, but noted that there is great doubt whether such trusts
qualify as charitable in the modern social situation. The court then
turned aside from the common law of trusts: "[I]t is our conclusion that
the ultimate criterion for determination whether such schools are eligible under the 'charitable' organization provisions of the Code rests not
on a common law referent but on that [of] Federal policy." 90 Noting
that there is a limitation on deductions for business expenses under
section 162, in that business expenses incurred in violation of public
policy are not deductible, the court ruled that this public policy limitation on tax benefits applies a fortiori in the charitable deduction context.
The court pointed to various statutes and court decisions as proof of the
stringent federal policy against racial segregation in education and concluded that
[t]he Internal Revenue Code provisions on charitable exemptions and deductions
must be construed to avoid frustrations of Federal policy. Under the conditions of
today, they can no longer be construed so as to provide to private schools operating
on a racially discriminatory premise the support of the exemptions and deductions
which Federal tax law affords to charitable organizations and their sponsors."

The court noted that its statutory decision avoided the necessity of the
constitutional interpretation involved in Green I. The decision applied
to "all private schools practicing racial discrimination"; to that extent,
the Green II decision is broader than Green I, which applied only to
such schools operated as alternatives to integrated public schools. Because compliance by Mississippi private schools was doubtful, the court
enjoined the IRS from granting exemptions in Mississippi until the
schools had (1) adopted and meaningfully publicized racially nondiscriminatory policies and (2) furnished information on the composition of
the student body, faculty and staff; on applicants for admission; and on
incorporators, founders, and donors and any announced identification
of those persons with organizations having as a primary objective the
maintenance of segregated schools. The Green results met with approval
in the law reviews, but there was much criticism of the rationales employed.9"
90. Id.at 1161.
91. Id.at 1164.
92. Compare Note, Civil Rights-Segregation-Federal Income Tax: Exemptions and Deductions-The Validity of Tax Benefits to Private Segregated Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1410
(1970), with Note, Federal Taxation-Charities-TaxpayersMay Contest IRS Allowance of Exempt Status, and Organizations Whose Activities Violate Public Policy May Not Be Accorded
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Other Rationales Condemning the Federal Tax Benefit

The Green II decision, which is hardly a model of clarity, apparently adopted a frustration-of-policy rationale. Other rationales could
deprive segregated educational institutions of tax benefits. One approach would be the creation of a federal tax definition of charity; Green
II veered away from the possible adoption of this approach when it
dropped the analogy to the law of trusts. A federal definition of charity
need not coincide with state law definitions of charity, however. Courts
could develop a federal statutory common law of charity under section
170 in the same manner in which they have defined "capital asset" under

section 1221 .3 One factor to consider in determining whether an activity is charitable for federal law purposes is whether it frustrates federal
policy. This approach is valid only if "educational" is construed noscitur
a sociis; there are, however, at least two methods that will achieve the
same result even if "educational" is construed expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

One method is based upon the principle that all section 501 organizations must serve a public purpose.94 If the primary beneficiaries of an
organization's activities are the persons who contribute to the organization, then the organization serves a private rather than a public interest.95 Because private segregated academies usually are financed by contributions from parents whose children are educated by the school, the
contribution serves only a private purpose.
A second method is indicated by the statutory proposition that

organizations may receive tax benefits only if they are "organized and
operated exclusively for

. . .

educational purposes."9 The existence of

Favored Tax Treatment, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 544 (1972). Because the statutory arguments are so
powerful, the Michigan note advocates restraint in reaching constitutonal questions. The Texas
note urges that the decision should be based on constitutional grounds, rather than on "bizarre
contortions of business deduction doctrine." The Texas note has blistering criticism for the application of the frustration of policy doctrine outside the business deduction sections in which the
doctrine was created. The author apparently ignores the fact that much tax policy necessarily must
be developed around the business deduction sections because the Code strictly limits nonbusiness
deductions. To limit the frustration of policy exception to business deductions seems unwise.
93. See. e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (corn futures held
by corn products manufacturing concern were not capital assets because they were used as an
integral part of business operations); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (money received
by lessor for cancellation of long-term lease was not a capital asset because it was a substitute for
ordinary rental income).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959).
95. See Weil, Tax Exemptions for Racial Discriminationin Education,23 TAX L. REv. 399,
407-17 (1968). Compare Isable Peters, 21 T.C. 55 (1953), with Benedict Ginsburg, 46 T.C. 47
(1966).
96. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

1973]

PRIVATE WHITE SCHOOLS

a single substantial purpose not mentioned in the statute should deprive
the organization of favored status. Certainly one purpose for the organization and operation of private white academies is the avoidance of
integrated education; because this purpose is hardly de minimis, its
existence should be sufficient to deprive such schools of their favored
7
status.
F.

The ProposedPrivate School Tuition Federal Tax Credit

President Nixon has stated his support of a plan by which parents
whose children attend nonpublic schools could receive a federal income
tax credit for the tuition expenses they incur.9 8 If the plan can be drafted
to withstand first amendment attack, it probably would be available to
parents whose children attend nonreligious segregated academies. The
fact that such schools are ineligible for section 501 benefits would not
deprive parents of the credit; such a plan would improve the financial
feasibility of private white schools vastly and could swell their number
even further. Although the President apparently feels that such a plan
would withstand first amendment challenge because of Walz v. Tax
Commission," that is far from clear.

IV.
A.

THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE WHITE ACADEMIES

The Future of Private Academies Under Present Conditions

A study of Alabama private academies led researchers to conclude
in 1971 that the private school movement was quite strong. 10° Researchers found no evidence to suggest that parents were greatly concerned
about the deficiencies of private education and concluded that the movement would continue to grow unless economic conditions worsened dramatically or other factors became significant. Other observers have
refused such generalization, feeling that the future of the private academies depends on the nature of the community they serve. Private schools
in rural areas face a bleaker future than do those in metropolitan areas,
97. Allen, The Tax-Exempt Status of Segregated Schools, 24 TAx L. REV. 409, 424-29
(1969).
98. Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
99. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Although the Court sustained the property tax exemption in Walz
because of the absence of "entanglement," the existence of such exemptions for over 2 centuries,
without tending to establish religion, clearly influenced the Court. Property tax exemptions are
traditional; the proposed income tax credit is not. The Court should be reluctant to allow the

creation of new tactics that indirectly but significantly support religion.
100. Walden & Cleveland, The South's New Segregation Academies, PHI DELTA KAPPA,
December, 1971, at 234-39. This is the best concise source of information on the social impact of
private academies.
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for there are fewer persons able to afford the continued cost of private
education.' It is likely that private schools in counties in which the
white proportion of the population is high also will face difficulty, for
it is more likely that whites will return to public schools in such counties
than in counties with predominantly black public schools.
B.

Integration of Private Schools by Court Order

At least one court has considered the possibility of ordering the
integration of private white schools: "[I]f the state persists in its efforts
dedicated to this end [separate white schools], and its involvement with
the private school system continues to be 'significant,' then this 'private'
system will have become a state actor within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and will need to be brought under this Court's
state-wide desegregation order." 0 2 The genuineness of the prospects for
such an order depends on what state involvement the courts consider to
be significant.
A review of the private school cases reveals three important characteristics. First, they have involved in almost every instance the enjoining
of state assistance to private discrimination. Although there may have
been sufficient state involvement to order the desegregation of private
schools, the cases reveal notable reluctance to interfere with the discrimination itself. This was true even in the tuition grant cases, in which
plaintiffs showed the clearest state involvement. It is true that in the
public property cases courts enjoined the discrimination itself, but those
cases are subject to circumvention by merely shifting the site of the
discriminatory school to property which has never been public. Thus,
the courts have consistently permitted the discrimination, acting only to
assure that the discrimination is private, and enjoining only the state
involvement. Secondly, the private school cases have shown a decreasing
amount of state involvement in the private discrimination. As courts
battered down early methods of private school aid, states resorted to less
significant methods of assistance. Thirdly, the cases have shown decreasing amount of segregative purpose as inspiration of the assistance.
The most recent cases, Gilmore and Norwood, concern reasonable practices administered in a nondiscriminatory manner. It is true that the
purpose of the law is no longer as important as it was after Poindexter.
101. Some proof of the importance of the rural-urban dichotomy exists in the small Louisiana town of Port Allen. White school enrollment dropped one year during a boycott from 2,300
to 400; the next year, white enrollment returned to 1,100 and 5 of 7 private schools closed.
Charleston News & Courier, July 12, 1972, at 12.
102. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 478 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Gihnore and Tunica County rejected the importance of purpose, and
only Norwood indicated that it continued to be significant. The Supreme Court itself has said in the racial discrimination context that
"[t]he existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that
has an impermissible effect."' 3 Nevertheless, the purpose of a law is
still of some significance in determining its constitutionality, as the
court in Green I indicated. 104 Yet, given judicial reluctance to enjoin
the private discrimination itself, the decreasing importance of the state
aid, and the decreased importance of segregative motivation, it appears
that before courts will order private academy desegregation they either
will have to adopt less stringent criteria for state action or a basically
different approach to state action. Authority for both approaches exists.
The Supreme Court remarked in Cooper v. Aaron that "[s]tate
support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management,
funds, or property.

. ."'s violates

equal protection. Courts have found

state involvement in activity more remote to the private discrimination
than that involved in the private school cases. In the long Girard College
trust litigation, the Third Circuit found that state action existed in such
activities as supervision by public officials, rendering of services, provision of tax exemption, and allowance of perpetual legal existence.,"6
Private schools usually are involved with the state by perpetual corporate existence (though not all schools are incorporated), by property tax
exemption, and by at least limited educational supervision. The Wright
decision indicated that a court may find state action sufficient to compel
private school desegregation in credit terms favorable to the school,
since such terms provide an ongoing relationship of the state to the
school's discrimination. 07 The state action concept is still viable, but the
past century has witnessed a dramatic recharacterization of the activity
necessary to constitute state action. If this process continues, courts
may find the present slight amount of state involvement in most private
schools sufficient state action to bring the otherwise private discrimination within the coverage of the fourteenth amendment.
There also exist several conceptually different theories of state action that could bring private schools within the scope of the fourteenth
103. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
104. See text accompanying note 85 supra. See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207-12 (1970).
105. 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (emphasis added).
106. Commonwealth v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921

(1968).
107.

441 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1971).
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amendment, regardless of how fully private the schools are.,"5 The most
readily applicable theory is one under which any organization serving a
public function is subject to the equal protection clause because it discharges a state responsibility that otherwise the state would have to
discharge. State involvement of any kind is not required, because the
function served by the organization is a state function. Education of the
citizens of the state unquestionably is an essentially public function,
regardless of whether public or private schools provide the education.
Such a theory would apply to private academies, making their discrimination unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. Because the
breadth of the public function doctrine is so great, however, application
of the doctrine should be limited to extreme situations, as when private
schools actually appear to be destroying an integrated public educational system.'"9 Unless the Supreme Court makes use of the public
function or some other innovative doctrine more frequently than it has
in the past, however, lower courts probably will not apply such innovations in the private school context.
V.

CONCLUSION

Federal courts have endeavored to assure that private discrimination practiced by schools is truly private. In this endeavor, courts have
enjoined any significant state involvement as violative of the equal protection clause. The courts have shown no inclination to prohibit the
private discrimination itself, however, and it appears unlikely that
courts in the near future will take the innovative step of barring discrimination practiced by private white academies.
JAMES

E.

SMITH

108. Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 922,
929-33 (1968).
109. Such an extreme situation was presented in Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd.,
332 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. La. 1971), although that decision denied black plaintiffs any relief. The
judge stated the complete resegregation of the public schools was "an inevitable result of forced
integration of schools." Id. at 995. This commits the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc and
ignores the more deeply rooted underlying causes of public school resegregation.

